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Article 7

Abortion - - .Part XI
(A Legal Review Continued)
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Paul V. Harrington, P.A., J.C.L.

In the previous article, we
investigated the rights of the unborn
child in civil law to sue for pre-natal
injuries and under the wrongful death
statutes. We shall continue in this
article the consideration of the fetus
. and its status in the civil law.
2. The ·Right of the Fetus to
Receive Support
Kindregan refers to State Statutes
and two cases to demonstrate that the
fetus has the right to receive support
and that the state can vindicate and
enforce it. f
The Penal Code of California
requires a father to support all minor
children and an unborn child is
included within this requirement. 2 In
1933, a California Court indicated that
there was a crime involved in the
non-support of an unborn child and
the defendant could be so charged. 3
A second California decision Kyne
v. Kyne - in 1940 - ruled that a suit
could be brought before the court on
behalf of an unborn child in order to
have paternity legally determined and
4
in order to insure his proper support.
26~

An action was instituted juvenile
Court in Colorado on be; ·If of an
unborn child, claiming tha ~ ·he fetus
was a dependent child undr the state
statute concerned with su; ;ort. ·The
Supreme Court of the Sta!, tssuedan
order which rt1quired the d· ·- ndant to
set aside thirty per cent o . £1is salary
for the support of his un .. Jrn child.
The deCision relates that "' .} violence
is done to the orderly pn ·:~ ss of the
rational mind by letting the vord child
include a human being l :; 'mediately
upon conception." 5
3. The .Rights of a Fetus to Inherit
Provided a fetus is s~:bsequently
born alive, he has always er:j oyed from
the common law the righ · to inherit.
"The law of inheritance adopts the
view that if one dies intestate, his
unborn child, if born alive, inherits
equally with its older brothers and
sisters." 6 Atkinson states "An

(Monsignor Har r in g ton iS
Vice-Officialis for the A rchdiocese o/
Boston)
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state's posthumous child is
I)DSJi<leJred in being and will inherit
. as if he had been born in the
~:-1:estate's lifetime .... This was the
_,mmon law rule with respect to both
ealty !lnd personalty ... a
posthumous child may recover his
share of the father's land from a b~na
fi~e ·p~rchaser obtaining title through
&Judicial partition sale." 7
. A Massachusetts decision in 1834
4eclared that a bequest to children or
:IE anmacrulldt:en in existence at the time
of a testator's death would include a
posthumous child or grandchild who
en ventre sa mere at that time. 8
A will contested in New York in
7 reached an identical conclusion
ICC:Orttli'!n2 to the legal instrument, ~
fund was to be established from
residue of the testatrix' estate and
was to be ~ivided "in to as many
al parts as I may have
living at the time of my
It was ascertained by the
that a female grandchild had
conceived three weeks before the
of the testatrix and was
' in ~eing, existing and havin~
~t the time of her demise. The
.
made finding that she "was
18 a living child for . all purposes
.
to her property rights. " 9
lS about as close to the moment
con~eption· as one could hope to
This further indicates that the law
fetal life to be human and
fetus as a person from the very
of conception.
law, thus, . recognizes the
, the life, and the person of
fetus and his right, during prenatal
, to benefit from intestate
' from a will or a trust and
~ the exercise of this right after
~etus has been born.

4· The Rights ·of a Fetus under
Workmen's CompensationAct
A 1943 case in the United States
reached exactly the same conclusion as
a 1907 case before the English Courts
( cf. supra, .Williams v. Ocean Coal Co.,
Lt~., footnote #6): the conclusion
bemg that a child conceived before but
born only after the father's death is to
~e considered as in existence at the
tl~e .of the demise and, thus; to be the
recipient and beneficiary of any and
all benefits, under Workmen's
Compensation statutes, to which
existing children are entitled. 1 o

.....,

..

,,. ,

5 · The Right of a Fetus to Sue
before birth through a legally
appointed Guardian
. This capti.on includes two closely
mterrelated nghts - the right to have a
guardian legally appointed for a fetus
and the right of the fetus to bring an
act~?n .before the Courts, using the
servic~s of the legally appointed
guar~an -and, therefore, they will be
considered together.
In 1940, an expectant mother who
was a minor, petitioned for' the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for
her yet unborn child. The guardian
was appointed and she in turn
brought an action, in advance of birth
and ?n behalf of the fetus, before the
California Courts for the
determination of paternity and for the
assurance of support. The defendant
argued against the right of an unborn
c~ld .to sue but the Court recognized
this nght to sue when the litigation
sought a determination of paternity
and the enforcement of support. 1 1
New Jersey had two cases in its
courts in the 1960's - which referred
to the appointment of guardians ancl
to blood transfusions.
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In 19 61 , guardianship over an
unborn child was given to a county
department of welfare to ensure that
the child, when born , could and would
receive blood transfusions , that were
essential and necessary for his
continued good health. 1 2
The second case came before the
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1964. In
this particular case , the expectant
mother, because of religious reasons ·
and objections of conscience , would
not allow blood transfusions. The
Court ordered the appointment of a
special guardian for the protection of
his health. 1 3
In each of these cases, the courts
clearly recognized that the fetus had
rights - thus indicating that the fetus
is a person - and that these rights
could only pe safeguarded by the
appointment of a guardian who, in the
absence of the unborn child , would
seek his welfare and best interests.

6. The Right of a Fetus to Birth and
to Life
Under this caption, we shall
consider what right a fetus possesses to
be born and to live and what
recognition the law and the courts
have given to this right.
The English common law ,
. acknowledging the right of a fetus to
be born, would not allow the
execution of a pregnant woman , who
was charged and found guilty of a
capital offense , which was punishable
by death.
In former times, the law required
that the defendant be "quick with
child" before it would stay the
execution. The reason for insisting on
the "quick" rule, was the fact that this
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was the only real test of pre· nancy
that medical science had devel, ?ed in
that period. A devious, conspir 1g and
intriguing woman could 1se a
pregnancy as the reason or e;: :use to
delay an execution and no or · could
prove or disprove whether or tot she
was pregnant.
In specific ·instances, the English
Courts would actually imp ar~- a jury
of matrons, whose responsibiJ : y under
their oath , was to exan ;1e the
defendant and report bad- to the
court whether the wor• Lll was
pregnant by reason of havi, .~ found
her ·"quick" with child.
As medical science prese', ·ed valid
tests of pregnancy that wou! . indicate
the presence ot absence of s1. ::h a state
long before "quickening" . the law
abandoned the "quick" rule and now
pregnancy in any stage is <: :·eason to
seek and be granted -. stay of
execution. Also, the imparl Jing of a
jury of matrons has disap; : ared and
the examination of a ·ompetent
doctor will suffice. F j ~ . 1lly, the
execution is not only sta) ··d but set
aside completely and the d·.:fendant is
14
sentenced to penal servitud.; for life.
Barry notes: "When tl. : plea was
successful, the reprieve v-- as granted,
not out of considerati•. ;n of the
woman, but in favorem pro/is" (~
favor of the offspring).1 5 What this
statement says is that the reprieve was
not granted for a sentimental or
emotional reason just because the
woman was pregnant but it was given
because the law recognize:> that .a fetu~
has the right to be born and to bve an
execution of the mother would
deprive the fetus of thi basic right.
This was clearly set forth in a 1949
16
decision in State v. Cooper.
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might be interjected at this time
· the original laws, declaring
to be a crime, were passed
because the State recognized
right of a fetus to be born and to
and realized that such a right is
r.Utinl~ui:she:d by each abortion.
The fact that a fetus has a right to
born and thereby has aright t'o all
tbe:raJX!Utic measures necessary to
his prenatal health and his live
and the fact that the law and the
recognized these rights is
ent in two very important
;~:isi1ons with reference to blood

In 1961, a case was presented to the
Jersey Court The facts were
: a woman was in the advanced
of pregnancy , which was
~Jpllc:ated by erythroblastosis fetalis
blood incompatibility between
and child. If the chil'd were to
and to grow into a healthy
~DllStl:!r and develop normally , he
require transfusions of blood
birth to replace the diseased
he was carrying. In advance of
the mother indicated that,
of religious beliefs, she could
authorize and she would not allow
blood transfusions.
petition was presented to the
on behalf of the unborn child,
indicating that his very life and
was at stake unless the
were allowed. The court
these rights of the fetus to
and good health and realized that
State had a responsibility and
to enforce these rights.
decision in the Hoener v.
case, the Court considered
to be a minor child in the
of the statute which allows
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the court to take a child from the
custody of parents, when his best
interests are not being protected. In so
ruling, the Court relied on its civil
paternal jurisdiction, which imposes a
responsibility ·on the government to
protect the rights of its Citizens,
particularly citizens who are not in a
positio.n to care for themselves.
The court entrusted the unborn
child to a county welfare department
and authorized this body to provide
any and all care that the infant would
require to sustain his life and to assure
sound health. The decision clearly
indicated that the "fetus was before
the court." It need not be pointed out
that only persons come ·before the
courts. In passing, the court noted: "It

is now settled that an unborn child's
right to life and health is entitled to
legal protection, even if it is not
viable. " 1 7 (emphasis supplied)
The . second case was different in
regard to the · facts and more
complicated with reference to the legal
· implications. It was decided by the
Supreme Court . of New Jersey. The
expectant mother was in the
thirty-second week of her pregnancy
and was a patient in the hospital. She
required blood transfusions but would
not give permission. Without the
transfusions , the health and the life of
the unborn child were in jeopardy.
The hospital , wherein she was a
patient , sought the permission of the
court to administer blood against. the
conscientious objections of the
patient. The court faced a. serious
dilemma: on the one hand, the court
would wish to protect the life and
health of the unborn child ~ on the
other hand, the court would not wish
to achieve this objective by compelling
a mature adult to act involuntarily and
particularly when this would ·involve a
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violation of conscience. In the same
year, 1964, Georgetown University
Hospital had petitioned the courts for
authorization to transfuse a
non-pregnant adult against the wishes
and the religious objections of the
patient and the court refused to grant
permtsswn even though it was
demonstrated that transfusions of
healthy blood were necessary to
maintain life and hea1th. 1 8
In considering. the· conflict of rights
the right of the fetus to life and
birth and the right of the adult for
self-determination and for the
respectful following of religious beliefs
and principles of conscience - the
court concluded that the right of the
fetus to be born and to live was the
more important and must prevail :
"We are satisfied that the unborn child
is entitled. to the law's protection and
that the appropriate order should be made
to insure blood transfusions in the event
that they are needed. " 1 9

This decision was appealed but
review was denied. 2 0
As mentioned previously (cf. supra),
the Court also provided for the
appointment of a legal guardian for
the fetus , who was empowered to seek
any and all therapeutic assistance to
guarantee the safe delivery of the
child.
Because of the conflict of rights and
particularly because of the
determination of what right prevailed,
this case , in a very special way, points
up how basic and important is the
right of a fetus to be born and how
seriously the courts and the State
recognize their responsibility to
protect and safeguard this right.
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In the light of this decis· m, it
in . fact, it were found that
would seem quite contradicto y and
pen sable injury · ·and damage
inconsistent for the State to li' ·!ralize
The simultaneity of the injury
its abortion laws or to ~galize
conception was an innovation.
abortion , whereby the right )f the
fetus to be born would
ot be
In .a lengthy opi.nion , in which the
recognized or protected .and \ hereby
rt discussed the social and
the very life of the fetus \\' uld be I J iiCOlllOrnic implications of illegitimate
annihilated and extinguished.
and admitted that the injury was
· •:~conti.111uous and irreparable", the
7. The Right of the Fetu: Not to
was denied because it was
Be Born
that, since this was an
of the existing concept of
Having just established the :; ht of a
injury, the legislature should
fetus to be born and the resp 1sibility
lltc~rrnline if illegitimate birth was an
of the State and the courts t protect
for which there should be
this right, it seems contrad tory to
talk in terms of a fetus' righ t ~t to be
born. Two cases have rec ly been
Important for our consideration are
introduced with reference t 1e social
remarks of the Court with
condition of the fetus at .rth and
IIICI:en,~e to the right to life of a fetus:
have, at their very core, the 'Jligation
of a child to be born illegil · :late and
case at bar seems to be the natural
the right of a child to sue f ( damages
of the present course of the law
,_.lttilt~ actions · for physical injury ever
because of an illegitimate st<:1- iS.
to the moment of conception. In

A third case concerns the . · ligation
of a child to be born \Vl , 1 serious
physical defects.
The first case was brov .1t before
the courts of Illinois in 1:. ·3 . A son
sued his father for damage-· by reason
of having been born illegiti1 ate and as
the result of an adulterous mion. The
Court, in its decision, refe -·ed to this
situation as the tort of "wrongful
life". The injury to the cLdd did not
occur during pregnancy b<It actuallY
was simultaneous with his very
conception.
This type of complain t differed
from previous actions in that the
injury was not a physical injury but_ an
injury of reputation an d status in _life.
Thus, not being concrete or tangt~le,
there would be difficulty in assessing
damages or in arranging compensation,
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of time it goes just a little further. The

111De&n1re of this course to us is this: if
to be permitted an infant injured
after conception, why not if
one week after, one minute after or
moment of conception? It is
that the date will be further
- pessed. How can the law distinguish
day development of life? If there
life, proved by the subsequent
then that human life has the same
llt the time of conception as it has at
thereafter. (emphasis supplied)
be absolutes in the minute to
progress of life from sperm and
c_ell, to embryo to fetus, to

excerpt clearly indicates that as
as life and the right to life is
, there is · no logical or
basis for any distinction
as viability or non-viability. The
Which is conceived with the
of the sperm and the ovum to
the zygote is the same life which

is growing through each of the stages
of pregnancy and it is the same life
which is ultimately born and which
develops into the infant, the child, the
adolescence and the mature adult.
The second case was brought
initially before the New York State
Court of Claims in 1965 . The action
was brought on behalf of a female
child, born in December, 1962, by her
grandfather. He alleged that his
daughter - the mother of the child -,
an unmarried girl, while a patient at
Manhattan State Hospital in New York
City, was raped by another inmate and
as a result, she became pregnant and
the child was born illegitimate . The
suit further alleges that the rape
occurred because of improper
supervision, thus making the hospital
and the State liable , and that the
grandfather requested state authorities
to perform an abortion and their
refusal brought about the illegitimate
birth, for which injury compensation
is sought from the State of New York.
The decision by the Court of Claims
was rendered by Justice Sidney Squire
on June 25, 1965. He concluded that
such an action could be brqught and
there could be recovery for damages
sustained by having been born with
the social stigma of illegitimacy if it
could be- legally established that the
pregnancy resulted from a rape which
occurred because of improper
supervision of the patients by the
hospital. The decision noted that nipe
would be a "foreseeable" result by the
hospital authorities of improper
supervision.
Judge Squire indicated that he did
not approve the classification of the
case as "a cause of action for wrongful
life" and stated . that any expectation
of subsequent actions for birth with
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congenital defects would be
"unrealistic, illogical and
unsupportable" and without relation
22
to the findings in the present case.
The attorney for the child, Norman
Roy Grutman, contended that the
action was for an "injury" of not
having been put to death by abortio_n.
The New York Times quotes him as
saying that "it was this failure to abort
and ·therefore to mitigate damages that
23
lies at the heart of the case."
Kindregan notes that "the advocates
of Eugenic Abortion felt that this case
introduced the idea of 'wrongful birth'
into Anglo-American law - a theory
which would require the law to permit
'abortion whenever the child would
enter -the world under adverse
circumstances, e.g., as a mental or
physical defective' ." 2 4
The decision of Justice Squire was
reversed by the Appellate Division of
the State· Supreme Court, which held
that there "is no reasonable basis,
consistent with public policy, for
recognition of a cause of action
predicated, first, upon a supposed
objection on the part of the State to a
person to be conceived and, second,
upon allegations of damages not
25
susceptible of ascertainment."
The
Appellate Judge reasoned that it
would be impossible to compute the
damages because such computation of
compensation would . involve a
comparison of injury against the "void
of non-existence" .2 6
As stated above, the third case
concerns a child who was born with
physical defects. The facts of the case
are simple: Sandra Gleitman was
examined by Doctor Robert Cosgrove,
Jr. on April 20, 1959. At that time,
the doctor found her two months
pregnant. She informed the doctor
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that, about March 20, 1959 , i1e had
had an illness, which hr ; been
diagnosed as German Measle2 During
the next three months, the pa· mt was
seen by a doctor at Fort ~ordon,
Georgia, . where her husb; . d was
stationed. In July of 1959 , ·.he was
seen by Doctor Jerome D ian, an
associate of Doctor Cosgr· ,··e, and
made monthly visits until ·he was
delivered of a male child at Aargaret
Hague Maternity Center,
Jersey
City, on November 25, 19 ~) . A few
weeks after birth, it becam(' •. pparent
that the child, Jeffrey, had :efc!cts in
vision, hearing and speech. l :: has had
several operations which J ve given
him some visual capacity r.. ...f he has
attended a special c, ;rectional
institute ·for children with ..·sion and
hearing defects. His condiL ·n, which
is described by the court a:. 'seriously
impaired" is not in cor L )ltion or
dispute in the case? 7
There were three seJ.. · •ate and
distinct suits entered: the t.·st was an
action on behalf of Jeffrey S leitman,
the infant, for his birth c 'fects; the
second was a suit by Sandr·.· ~ Ieitman,
the mother for the effc . :s on her
emotional state caused b~.· her son's
condition; and the third w <::~ all action
entered by Irwin Gleitman ~: he father,
for recovery of damages fiased upo~
the costs incurred in the c2ring of his
son.
The trial court dismiss:: d, without
sending to the jury, the pe Ution of the
0
child, when the evidence". bearing ~
his complaint, had beeG completed
and the actions of the mother an
father when all the evidence had ..beenn
presented. The Appellate DiVIS10 '
without entertaining :argument and t~
its own motion sent the case to
'
f NeW
Supreme Court in the State o
Jersey.
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. Supreme Court on March 6
aflrrmed the dismissal of th~
by the trial court. Four of
seven judges voted for the
and the remaining three
for reversal.. There were four
rendered: a majority opinion
the four justices; a concurring
by one of the four justices; a
IISeJntilt~ opinion, which was signed
two of the justices and a partially
JlleJntir"1~ opinion by the Chief
. Thus, only two of the seven
were in complete disagreement
the majority view.
Gleitman, in her petition,
that Doctor Cosgrove, when
about the attack of German
assured her that this would
no effect at all on her child.
Cosgrove, in his testimony,
this allegation and stated that,
presence of another doctor and
patient's mother, he had advised
that there was a twenty per cent
that the child could be born
a defect. He added that, while
doctors might recommend an
he would not because he did
consider it wise to destroy four
babies merely because the
might be born with a defect.
Dolan stated that the
had never questioned him
the effects of German measles
child and he did not discuss the
with her. In addition, he
out that when he saw her, she
In her fifth month of pregnancy
a medically safe abortion could
performed at that time.
theory of plaintiffs suit is
negligently failed to
Mrs. Gleitman, their patient, of
which German measles
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might have upon the infant then in
gestation. Had the mother been so
informed, plairltiffs assert, she might .
have obtained other medical advice
with the view to the obtaining of an
abortion. Plaintiffs do not assert that
Mrs. Gleitman's life or health was in
jeopardy during the term of . her
pregnancy ." 2 8
The trial court, as previously noted
dismissed all complaints without
submitting any of them to the jury:
the complaint of the infant was
dismissed because there was no
evidence that the acts of the
defendants were in any way the
proximate cause of his condition; the
actions of the parents were dismissed
because the trial judge believed the
suggested abortion would be criminal
in accordance with the statutes of New
Jersey.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey
in the instant case,' referred to th~
right of an infant in New Jersey to sue
for prenatal injuries as set forth in a
previous decision of the same Tribunal
(Smith v. Brennan, 31 N. J. 353, 157
A 2d 497 (1960) ) and quoted from
this decision:
"The semantic argument whether an unborn
child is •a person in being' seems to us to be
beside the point.· There is no question that
conception sets in motion bioiogical
processes which if undisturbed will produce
what everyone will concede to be a person
in being. " 2 9
,

The majority opinion continues:
..The infant plaintiff is therefore required to
say not that he should have been born
without defects but that he should not have
been born at all ... he claims that the
conduct of defendants prevented his mother
from obtaining an abortion which would
have tenninated his existence, and that his
very life is •wrongful'." 30
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With reference to compensatory
damages, the court stated:
"Damages are · measured by comparing the
condition plaintiff would have been in, had
the defendants not been negligent, With the
plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of
the negligence. The infant plaintiff would
have us measure the difference between life
with defects against the utter void of
nonexistence, but it is impossible to make
such a determination. This court cannot
weigh the value of life with impairments
31
against the nonexistence of life itself. "

As to the damages, sustained by the
parents, Judge Proctor, writing the
majority opinion, noted:
"Denial of the claim for damages by adult
plaintiffs is also required \>y a close look at
exactly what it is they are here seeking. The
thrust of their complaint is that they were
denied the opportunity to terminate the life
of their child while he was an
embryo .. : substantial policy reasons
prevent the court from allowing tort
damages for the denial of the opportunity
to take an ·embryonic life."

"It is basic to the human condition to seek
life and hold on to it . however heavily
burdened. (emphasis supplied) If Jeffrey
could have been asked as to whether his life
should be snuffed out before his full term of
gestation could run its course, our felt
intuition of human nature tells us he would
almost surely choose life with defects as
32
against no life at all. "

Referring to the right to life and to
the worthwhileness of life, the
majority opinion very forthrightly
observed:
"The right to life is inalienable in our
society. A court cannot say what defects
should prevent an embryo from being
allowed life such that the denial of the
opportunity to terminate the existence of a
defective child in embryo can support a
cause for action. Examples of famous
persons who have had great achievement
despite physical defects come readily to
mind, and many of us can think of examples
close to home. A child need not be perfect
to have a worthwhile life."
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"We are not faced here with the ne .
balancing the mother's life again ~
her child. The sanctity of the sing· human
life is the .decisive factor in this su in tort.
Eugenic considerations are not co . trolling.
We are not talking here about the )reeding
of prize cattle. It may have been . · 1sier for
the mother and less expensive for ' ·re father
to have terminated the life of t ~ir child
while he was an · embryo, but th r •,, alleged
detriments cannot stand ag,. ·zst the
preciousness of ·the single hum ,· · life to
support a remedy in tor.t." 3 3 .;mphasis
supplied)

The court concluded its de ;sian by
remarking:
"Though we sympathize
.·ith the
unfortunate situation in which tl t· .0 parents
fmd themselves, we firmly belie'. . the right
of their child to live is greatc' ;·han and
precludes their right not
endure
emotional and financial . injury . and even
if such alleged damages were C( . ·rizable, a
claim for th~m would be preclu· ·ed by the
counterwaiting public policy suv <,rting the
34
preciousness of human life. "

While Justice Francis· ac .;pted the
arguments and the con elm:. ms of the
majority opmwn, he p· .: pared a
lengthy concurring opinim. in which
he presented additional co1 ::.iderations
and observations, whkn further
confirmed and establishfd , in his
opinion, the majority find(ng that the
actions, presented by th~; plaintiffs,
were not cognizable in 1he law and
should be dismissed.
In general, Justice Fran ;~; s relied on
the position that abortion i · illegal and
criminal in the state of New Jersey and
i~ most other states in every
circumstance -save where the life of the
mother is endangered by the
continuation of the pregnancy.. Since
this is so, the plaintiffs could not
expect the doctors either to perforJJI
the abortion or even recommend an
abortion in the situation where the life
and health of the mot he r were not
involved and wh e re onlY the
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of the child being born
was at issue. The conclusion
therefore, clear: there was no
ce on the part of . the
t doctors; there was no injury
father, mother or child; there
ne ~ction that was cognizable by
law.
The concurring opinion provides an
llent history of abortion
and its purpose in New
. The statute was passed in 1849
result of a quashing of an
nt for abortion by the
Court in that same year. The
for the quashing was the
ClUirei1ner1t in common law that the
of abortion existed only in the
of the life of a "quick" child
in the instant case, (State v.
22 N.J.L. 52) quickening had
as yet occurred when the
~tancv was te.rrninated.
was felt that the common law
be modified by a statutory
and this gave birth to the
statute which forbade abortion
stage of a pregnancy "without
justification." This legislation
the mother, the child and
morality in a way which the
law could not.
a footnote, Justice Francis
from a dicision of the Supreme
of l(entucky in an identical case
v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky.
to demonstrate the necessity of
to correct the inadequacy
common law:
interest of good morals ~d for the
of society, the law should
&OCirtil[}n~ and miscarriages, willfully
at any time during the period of
That the child shall be considered
nee from the moment of

-
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coneeption for the protection of its .rights
of property, and yet not in existence until
fo'!r or five months after the inception of its
bemg, to the extent that it is a crime to
destroy it, presents an anomaly in the law
that ought to be provided against by the
law-making department of the
government. ,:rs
~ith reference to the 1849 statute,
wh1ch was not substantially changed in
the revisions of 1872, 1898, or 1952,
Justice Francis remarks:

"The lawmakers were saying as a matter of
public policy that the moment the womb
becomes. instinct with embryonic life, it
should be unlawful to interrupt the ordinary
development of the life 'without lawful
~ustiftcation.' In my judgment, the more
unportant consequence of the statute is the
~egislative recognition
and sequential
mcorporatio~ in the . law of the principle
that th~ child as a legal entity begins at
co~cept10n, as of that time it has a legal
existence as a separate entity as
distinguished from a mere part of its
mot~er's body. Distinctions based upon
p_hysiCal status during gestation such as
embryo, fetus and viability lost their earlier
impact on the crime of abortion. It was not
until relatively recent years · that the
judiciary became aware of the fact of the
· ~tent of the legislation." 36

· Referring to the argument that the
original statute of 1849 made
provisions for the health as well as for
th~ ~ife of the mother, the concurring
opmwn remarked:
"There is nothing in the legislative language
to support that idea. It seems to me there
:-vere two objectives, of about equal
tmport~ce. One was to provide greater
protectiOn for the child in utero than was
given under the common law. , To
accomplish this, the safeguard against
abortion was moved backward from the
time when the child became quick, to the
moment of conception. Important sequelae
have flowed directly or indirectly from this
change . . . The unborn child exists as a
legal entity from the moment of
conception. The second objective was to
furnish additional protection for the life and
h~al~ of. t~e. mother by establishing the
cnrmnal liability for the abortionist as of
the beginning of the pregnancy. " 3 7
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Justice · Francis concluded that the
abortion in this particular case could
hardly be called therapeutic and must
be considered eugenic:
"A termination of pregnancy of the type
mentioned in this case is described properly
in ·the. Chief Justice's dissent as a eugenic
abortion. Eugenics is the science which
commits itself to improving the stock,
whether human or animal; to means and
methods of improving the · physical and
mental qualities of future generations, to
control of mating and reproduction. In the
context of a case like the present one, a
eugenic abortion would be one based on the
probability or possibility that the fetus may
be born as a mentally or physically ·
abnormal person. No American statute
38
authorizes such an abortion. "
.
.

Commenting on eugenic abortion,
the concurring opinion noted:
"Yet the eugenic abortion advocates would
destroy every fetus when associated with an
early pregnancy rubella. . .. there are
doctors who feel that abortion in rubella
cases represents a negative approach. They
hold the ·view that their profession is
devoted to the preservation of life, not to its
destruction; that the major efforts in this
field should be based on research and
pointed toward prevention, not
destruction. " 3 9

Justice Francis
concurring sentence:

concludes

his

"Under all the circumstances of this case, in
my judgment it would have been a crime for
Doctor Cosgrove or Dolan or any other New
Jersey physician to abort the normal
pregnancy of Mrs. Gleitman because she had
had rubella in the first trimester of her
pregnancy. Consequently, the defendants
did not violate any legal duty which would
make them liable in damages to her or her
husband or their child, even if they failed to
advise her of the possibility that her child
might be defective, and that there were
places where she could have an abortion
performed, if she elected to do so."
"Furthermore, as I suggested above, no such
abortion has ever been sanctioned as lawful
in any other state. The contrary appears to
be the case, and even more strongly so than
in New Jersey, because in all but a minimal
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number of states, by express ·atutory
provision, preservation of the liJ. of the
mother is made the only cause for ; \Jortion.
But, even if there were some state v. foreign
country where an abortion for rut Ua were
lawful in the face of the presei ~ strong
public' policy of New Jersey again:· such an
abortion, no cause of action for 'i amages
should be recognized in New J, ·1ey if a
local physician did not advise 11 . patient
40
that some such form existed."

Chief Justice Weintraub ·Hrote a
partly dissenting opmwn m the
Gleitman v. Cosgrove and D l ')n case.
He· ~greed in part with the m. ~ o rity in
that the complaint of the ,_ J.ld was
not cognizable in law but h: felt that
the parents did sustain a wr, qg or an
injury and, while he conce(1 J that it
would be difficult to ev":, ~ate the
damage in a compensatory · :·)hion, he
felt that a jury · unde; judicial
supervision could arrive at ar ::quitable
settlement.
·
In his opinion, he m Je some
interesting observations:
"Contraception and abortion i· .J.ve this in
common that whereas in rn c<. t areas of
criminal' prohibition the fac. of e~ is
evident to most people, here tr ..;re is evil or
none at all depending whc;1y upon .a
spiritual supposition, for while ·nen agre~tt
is wrong to take life, yet kno ,,.i ng nothiJig
about the void before or after iheir earthlY
presence they cannot agree up·"n the point
at which a living thing should h~ thou~ht _to
be human in its being. We kno\,' there ts ~e
in the ovum and sperm befOI\, concep~on
but as to the morality of contraception,
every argument starts from and returns to
an ethical or religious assumption. Hence he
who opposes and he w;w supports
contraception is equally sure he respects the
dignity of man: And so as to abortio~,
cannot agree upon the stage at wh~ch Jiti
embryo or fetus has a claim to acquue e
·de a
in human form strong enough to ove~
woman's right to her own
integrity. " 41

m:

The Chief Justice in this quotation,
,
ake
errs by attemptin g to m.
contraception, which is the preventto~
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, analogous to abortion, which is
takiilg of life. Also, he indicates
man may find it difficult to
11termir1e when human life begins to
but embryology very clearly
that it begins at conception. He
encounter. a difficulty in
when this human life
a right to be born but the
jurisprudence unhesitatingly
that this rigpt is acquired at

is inconceivable that the granting
respecting of a fetus' right to live
be born can in any way violate the
s right to bodily integrity.
respect to the claim advanced on
of the infant, l agree with the
that it cannot be maintained.
the infant's complaint is that he
be better off not to have been born.
who knows nothing of death or
~·&""il>il>, cann~t possibly know whether

must remember that the choice is not
being born with health or being
t it; it is not claimed the
failed to do something to
or reduce the ravages of rubella.
the choice is between a worldly
and none at all. Implicit, beyond
against a physician for faulty
is the proposition that a pregnant
who, duly informed, does not seek
· and all who urge her to see the
through, are guilty of wrongful
to the fetus, and indeed that every
which the infant is sustained after
a ~Y of wrong. To recognize a right
born is to enter an area in which
could fmd his way." 42

in other respects the mother is hurt in
right by the denial to her of her
accept or reject a parental ·
with the child. The father, too,
right is wholly dependent upon
decision, is so directly
her decision that he may fairly
as a victim of a wrong done to
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One is tempted to inquire if it is not
a complete inversion of order and
values to hold that a woman, who·
voluntarily consented to a sexual
relationship with her husband, which
gives rise to the pregnancy, has the
right to reject her relationship to the
child thus conceived when this
rejection deprives him of his basic,
fundamental and ·inalienable right to
live and to be born. Can anyone's right
ever be considered totally and entirely
by itself to the complete exclusion of
a consideration of how the rights of
others might be violated or denied
when said person seeks the honoring
of his own personal right?
Since when and by what reasoning
did a husband's right over his offspring
become so dependent on his wife's
rights and decisions to the extent that
he can be denied the right to . a child
merely because his wife, seeking her
own pleasure and convenience, has
decided to terminate a pregnancy? Has
the husband made no contribution to
the formation of the fetus?
"It would be difficult to strike a net balance
between the intangible pluses IDld minuses
in a parent-child relationship, and it would
be the rare case in which a parent would
testify that it is his or her present wish that
the child had not been born. No one who
has witnessed the love of a parent for an
imbecile could expect so crass a
computation from the parent's lips. But I
believe that even without such testirilony an
outsider could evaluate the injury, and I
would recognize a right in the parents to
seek that evaluation, subject to car~ful
judicial supervision, in order to support the
woman's right to choose whether to risk this
misfortune."44

From these three cases, it is cleai
that the courts do not recongize any
action of "wrongful life" and do not
believe that a fetus has a right "not to
be born" when the alternative might
be birth with social stigma or birth
with physical defects.
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8. The Personality Status of Fetal
Life in State Constitutions
At this juncture, it is important and
useful to inquire what status an
unborn child enjoys under State
Constitutions. Is a fetus considered for
legal purposes to be a person?
Kindregan presents a norm and
criterion whereby this que~tion 'can be
answered. He suggests that if the fetus
is endowed with rights that are
customarily granted only to persons,
then the fetus is judged to be a person.
1

"The lawyer can reasonably believe that a
fetus is a person because the law has
consistently invested fetal life with civil
rights in every area of litigation in which the
questi9n has arisen. . .. Every indication
points toward the conclusion that a fetus is
a person under constitutional law because
our legal process has consistently treated
45
him as a person vested with civil rights."

Kindregan points to the decisions of
two State Supreme Courts - Oregon
and Ohio - to demonstrate that the
Constitutions of these States clearly
identify a fetus as a person. In the
Mallison v. Pomeroy (205 Or. 690,
291 P. 2d 225 (1955)) case, a suit was
brought to recover for injuries that
had been sustained by a six month
fetus. The Constitution of Oregon
"assured a remedy by due course of
law to every ' person for injury done to
him in his person. The Supreme Court
of Oregon noted that the . State had
recognized 'the separate entity of an
unborn child by protecting him in his
property rights and agajnst criminal
conduct,' and concluded that an
unborn child is a person within the
meaning of the state constitution." 4 6
The Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit case (152 Ohio St. 114, 87
N.E. 2d 334 (1949) ) was decided
under a provision of the Ohio
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Constitution which provides tl .t "all
courts shall be open, and every : erson,
for an injury done him in lu land,
goods, person or reputation sh.- .1 have
a remedy by due course of 1 w and
shall have justice administerr i him
without denial or delay." (Ohio
Constitution, Sec. 16, art. 1)
This action was brought in suit to_
recover for prenatal · injur• ·s that
resulted from an accident i which
there was alleged negligent c -eration
of a bus. The Supreme Cou: of the
State of Ohio made a finding .hat the
fetus was a person within the
and interpretation
above-mentioned section o f 'le state
Constitution:
"to hold that the plaintiff in the : ;tant case
did not suffer an injury in her pe: .· n would
require
court to announct Jiat as a
matter of law the infant is a . :rt of the
mother until birth and has n separate
existence in law until that time. . " our view
such a ruling would deprive the ir ant of the
right conferred by the Constit1 ion of aD
persons, by the application of < ;.ime-~o~
fiction not founded on fact " 1d Within
common knowledge U l' .::u e and
unjustified. " 4 7

this

. and t~ be protected from the
. actiOnS . of ~th~rs, . which
mterfere wtth h1s nght to be
and his basic right to life;
1a w

recognizes, as does
that human life exists
the moment of conception, that
fetus is a distinct and separate
from the mother, although
t upon her for circulatory
nutritional ·needs, and that this
life is found and vested in a
who has rights - not the least
is the right .to live and to be

.,._.,,..

11
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COROLLARY
the fetus has human life from the
moment of conception and is a
person, does it have the
guarantee of equal
with ·a born child against
deprived of that life without due
of law? If, in fact, it does have
have this protection, would
proposed legislative statutes to
existing abortion laws be in
of equal protection and due

SUMMARY
We have considered the fetus and
the unborn child with n : erence to
many and varied rights whj_ ch he has
been accorded by constit t:~.ional and
statutory law and by juri·;prudential
judgement: the right of the fetus .to
sue for prenatal injuries, to rece1ve
support, to .inherit, to re(.,over under
Workmen's Compensation Act, to sue
before birth through a legallY
appointed guardian. Further, we have
demonstrated that the law does not
recognize an action of wrongful life or
the right of a fetus not to be b~rnt
Finally, we have established th~ r~~
of a· fetus to be free from criJnlll
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would appear only logical and
to expect that law will not
within itself contradictory
or incompatible holdings. If
human life in general is protected
Federal and State Constitutions
this life cannot be violated,
away or extinguished without
of law, then it would seem
that this same protettion
~anteed to unborn, fetal life,
recognized by law and
llll«llen,~e to be human life from
moment of conception and to
in a human person, and that
life cannot be tampered
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with, diminished · or extinguished
without due process 6f law. If this be
true, then it would seem that the
suggested statutes to liberalize present
abortion laws would violate the

fourteenth amendment guarantee of
equal protection unless it is proved
that the provisions of these statutes do
not discriminate against unborn life, as
compared to born life, and that the
proposed preca,utions do in fact
constitute due process of law.Kindregan, a professor of law at
Suffolk University Law School, states:
" ... repeal of all abortion prohibitions
would not be compatible with
con temporary understanding of the
equal-protection clause of the U. S.
Constitution. Equal protection is becoming
ever more a positive concept; in this our
constitutional law is reaching toward a ~ore
civilized standard of jurisprudence. Can a
State simply refuse to provide equal
protection for the lives of persons within its
jurisdiction because they have not passed
through the stage of birth? To do so would
violate the positive duty of the State to
insure the lives of all persons against
arbitrary treatment. Are we prepared to say
that ~e State is maintaining equal
prot~ction of law when it allows one person
to kill another because he is defective or is
just ??t 'want~d'? The Anglo-American legal
tradition conSistently recognizes the human
person as coming into existence at·
conception (in property, tort and
constitutional law, as well as in criminal
law); are the States to now confer licenses
Qf discrimination against persons in
utero?"48

Byrn, a professor of law at Ford4am
· University, maintains:
" ... the child, if he is a separate human
entity, is entitled to the protection of the
law. The Fourteenth Amendment, of
course, forbids state action which deprives a
person of the equal protection of the
law..... It is for the proponents of
abortion to bear the burden of proving that
this separate human life (the unborn child)
is not a personal life to be protected by the
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· Fourteenth Amendment. It is interesting
that Professor Bernard Schwartz, in
speaking about the unconstitutionality of
discriminatory legislation directed against
Negroes, has -said that since .we have no
scientific evidence to show that the negro is
inferior, we may not discriminate against
him without running afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Apparently we
cannot, with any scientific validity establish
a different and inferior quality of life in the
unborn child; therefore the same principle
should apply and we should be abie to say
to the persons who urge abortion, 'you have
not born~ your burden of proving that this
life is inferior and that. it may be treated in
an unequal and discriminatory manner by
deprivi~ it of the equal protection of the
law'." 4

The same writer proclaims:
"There is · no qualitative difference,
scientifically speaking, between human life
in the womb and human life after birth.
Hence, legislation, which would remove the
life of a person in the womb from the full
and equal protection of the law, would be as
discriminatory, as irrational, and as inimical
to the equal protection clause as the
50
legislative classification of races."
(emphasis_supplied)

Louisell, Professor of Law at
University of California, Berkeley, in a
paper entitled, Abortion, the Practice
of Medicine and the Due Process of
Law, sets forth the following
observations:
"The justification of the abortion (under
the recommendations of the American Law
Institute) would therefore involve no
judicial process and no representation of the
public interest or that of the husband or
unborn child. In fact justification is
complete upon the request of the pregnant
woman and certification of two physicians
without involvement of or even information
to any other agency or person, except that
the hospital and, in the case of abortion
based on felonious intercourse the
prosecuting attorney or the police, must be
notified. Does this easy path to destruction
of the fetus potentially conflict with our
ethic of reverence for human life, and the
legal norm crystallized in the constituional
mandate of due process of law? The
question should be considered in the

278

context of the · law's historic l:! _titude
respecting the fetus as a
person. . . . The progress of the <lW in
recognition of the fetus as a human ;>erson
for all purposes has been strong and steady
and roughly proportional to the gr· wth of
knowledge of biology and embryok .:;y. The
current abortion proposals cons1 tute a
threat to this progress .. . i e law
proceeding apace to recognize in ··.is area
(tort actions), as it historically has n other
areas, that the . unborn child is . human
person .. . . The basic legal right of the
unborn child · are therefore as ecurely
rooted generally as those ( · other
persons. . .. But the law forfeits he legal
right to life only for grave reason end after
due process. The proposed legisfa <On may
forfeit life for reasons potentially •Jt grave
in relation to the seriousnes·· of the
forfeiture itself, and wholly wH ut any
process of law - unless the opini· 1 of two
physicians can be considered as s1. h. . . . It
would be strange for the law, soch ,,y's organ
for deciding matters of life and leath, to
delegate to two physicians - om f whom
may have self-interest as the -~ spective
fee-earning surgeon - the exclusb function
of deciding who shall live and c -·~. Such a
function invokes the due process . f law, not
the ipse dixit of two physicians. . .. If the
child's right to life is to be ,.,dghed for
example against a parent's desi~ -~ to avoid
the prospect of a gravely defecti'- child, the
ethos of our law would seem to ,.:,quire that
the scales be judicial ones, wh ;:;h should
register decision only after dut process of
law.... The medical professio, , should be
wary of a statute that wm1 d formallY
ordain the legal right of any t ~ 1 physicians
to justify an abortion under ~;:e nebulous
standards proposed. In prh,ciple, that
profession should be reluctant to exchange
its historic role of champion in th e struggle
for life
for the role c•f even a
well-inte'ntioned judge-e:- cc utioner.
Moreover, physicians as much :t~ manY men
stand in need of the due proce~;s of law, an~
should realize · that the rights !.>f anY of us
are sec~\e only while . thost; of all are
secure."

CONCLUSION
It is inconceivable that a law that

recogm·zes fetal life as human life frotll
0
the very moment of conceptifl
'
accepts the fetus as a human person,
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with many legal rights - not
of which is the right · to be
·and to be allowed to grow and
without interference - , a law
assumes a responsibility to grant
born life that equal protection
due process of law' which is
d to all life and is made
to born life, .
it is
IHloeiva:ble that such law would
ate or dare, by statutory
, to allow the arbitrary taking
extinguishing of unborn life
to preserve the health, personal
or convenience of the
to avoid the birth of retarded
defective children or to
remedy for felonious
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ergency Shipments to Nigeria

thousand, seven hundred and
pounds of medical supplies
tly needed to relieve the
of war refugees in Nigeria
afra were shipped on
y, July 17th, via ocean
, by the Catholic Medical
Board, 10 West 17th St., New
City. _
shipment valued at $13,257.76
is the latest in a series of
consignments of medical
forwarded by the Board to
the victims of Nigeria's civil war.
of infants' nutritional
analgesic
tablets, bandages,
soap, and enrichment
, a food supplement for
ficient diets, and was due to
in Nigeria about August 7th.
on the high seas was a
shipment which was expected
in Apapa, on Nigeria's coast,
19th. Valued at $87,653.95
, · it also contains infants'
onal products, vitamins,
and dressings in addition to
anti-tuberculosis, malarials,
drugs .. These supplies
be used in Nigeria's Northern,
, Bonny, and Calabar
including such towns as
Nsukka, Ikom, Ogoja, Agbor,
Patani, and those west of the
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The Board ·made four special
shipments of medical supplies earlier
· this year to the area, via Lisbon - one
in 1a~uaty, , two in February, and one
in June, These supplies, valued at
$88,905.91 wholesale, included
medical and surgical instruments,
hospital goods of all kinds, and
disease-fighting products such as
tetanus toxoid vaccine, antibiotics,
sulfonamides, antidiarrheals, vitamins
and iron prepara,tions.
With its July 17th shipment, the
Board has forwarded since the
beginning of the year $406,817.62
(wholesale value) worth of medical
supplies to assist the civil war refugees.
These shipments include six special
consignments and the Board's general
shipment requested by Catholic
missionaries' hospitals, dispensaries,
clinics, orphanages, schools, etc. The
Board's general shipment, which
arrived in Nigeria in mid-February, had
a wholesale value of $217,000.
Two of the .special shipments were
requested by Catholic Relief Servi<;es
in New York and in Lagos, the
Nigerian capital, where CRS works
with the Nigerian and International
Red Cross to assist refugees displaced
by the war. Distribution of the
Catholic Medical Mission Board's
general shipment, as well as its two
special shipments, was under CRS
supervision and .covered war-disaster
areas.
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